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ARTICLE
Strategies for robustness: Five perspectives on how policy
design is done
Martijn Van der Steena,b and Mark van Twista,b
aErasmus School of Social and Behavioral Science, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands; bNetherlands School of Public Administration, The Hague, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Robust policy design is an activity that is ‘done’ by policymakers; in this
paper we look further into how exactly robust policy design is done.
We use the literature on strategizing to distinguish various theoretical
perspectives on how policy design is done in practice. Moreover, we
conducted a survey-feedback study with a group of senior level policy-
makers to see what they do when ‘doing’ robust policy design, how
they think it should be done, and what they think are challenges for
doing robust policy design in the context of a public organization. The
study shows that although the language of strategy and policy design
is rooted in the rational-analytical ‘planning’ approach, other perspec-
tives are in fact more suitable for designing robust policies for deeply
uncertain and volatile conditions. Moreover, our study shows that
practitioners are well-aware of this bias; they have developed practical
ways to combine the rational-analytical approach to design that is
expected from them with other approaches for doing design.
KEYWORDS
Strategy; robustness; policy
design; strategy-as-practice;
survey-feedback
Introduction
There is a renewed interest in strategic thinking in the ﬁeld of public policy. The combina-
tion of high levels of uncertainty (Walker, Marchau, & Swanson, 2010; 2013) high levels of
complexity (Cavano &Mares, 2004; Morçöl, 2012; Teisman, Van Buuren, & Gerrits, 2009),
and the increased ‘wickedness’ of issues (Head & Alford, 2013; Peters, 2017) proposes
strong challenges for policymakers who wish to design robust policies (Howlett, Capano, &
Ramesh, 2018; Capano&Woo, 2018a, 2018b; Howlett &Mukherjee, 2014). There aremany
possible deﬁnitions of robustness, but here we follow the deﬁnition used in this Special
Issue, by Capano and Woo (2018a); a policy is robust when it can maintain performance
under a high degree of turbulence that cannot be projected beforehand (Howlett. Capano &
Ramesh, 2018). Robust policy is policy that is ﬁt for a yet unknown purpose, able to deliver
outcomes in spite of a changing environment and changing conditions.
Policy design is (Howlett et al., 2018, p. 19)
a speciﬁc form of policy formulation based on the gathering of knowledge about the eﬀects of
policy tool use on targets and the application of that knowledge the development and imple-
mentation of policies aimed at the attainment speciﬁcally desired public policy outcomes and
ambitions.
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Policy design is a deliberate and conscious attempt to achieve a certain goal, in contrast
with opportunistic, symbolic or intuitive ways of to apply instruments to public goals.
These deﬁnitions indicate a set of criteria for calling policy formulation a design and for
calling a design robust; robustness is the ability to remain eﬀective under uncertainty
and unknown future dynamics, and design is the deliberate use of knowledge and
information to match instruments with public goals.
These deﬁnitions mark what robust policy design is, but they do not explicate how
robust policy design is done. Although design is deﬁned as a verb, the type of activity or
process it involves is left open. That is why in this paper we are interested in how robust
policy design is done? What are possible approaches, or routes, to do it? And how are
these perceived by policymakers? Therefore, the research question that guides our paper
is as follows; what are theoretical approaches for doing robust policy design and how do
these approaches relate to the practice of policymakers?
To answer the ﬁrst part of the research question we will use literature from the ﬁeld
of strategy and ‘strategizing’ to distinguish the variety in approaches or routes to do
robust policy design. The strategy literature has a long tradition of debate about the
question what strategizing is and how it should be done (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson,
Langley, Melin, & Whittington, 2007; Mintzberg, 1987; Whittington, 1996). From the
strategy-literature we distinguish ﬁve perspectives to think about doing strategy; we
discuss the speciﬁc properties of each perspective and identify how each perspective
deals with uncertainty and volatility, and how robustness is achieved. After that, we
answer the second part of our research question with ﬁndings from a survey-feedback-
study that we conducted with policymakers. We asked policymakers how they perceived
the normative quality and the practical relevance of the various routes for robust policy
design. Their answers show how they see the applicability of diﬀerent approaches in
practice, and also present new insight in some of the dilemmas of robust policy design.
After this, we use the empirical ﬁndings from the Delphi Study to reﬂect on the possible
routes for the design of robust policy.
Theoretical framework
Strategy is often deﬁned, sometimes in slightly diﬀerent phrasing, as a plan of action
designed to achieve an overall aim (Stewart, 2004; Whittington, 1993); or, as Lusk and
Birks (2014) deﬁne it, as a choice of options to achieve strategic intent. These deﬁni-
tions of strategy are quite similar to the deﬁnition of policy design (Howlett et al., 2018;
Howlett & Mukherjee, 2014); both refer to the ability to deliberately connect tools and
instruments to stated policy goals, and to do that in a thought-through manner. That is
why in the light of our research question it is interesting to see how the strategy-
literature conceptualizes ‘strategizing’, in order to distinguish diﬀerent theoretical
approaches for ‘doing robust policy design’.
The strategy-literature contains a wide variety of perspectives of what good strategy
is and what strategy-practitioners, or strategists, do when they engage in strategy
(Jarzabkowski, 2005; Llewellyn & Tappin, 2003; Lusk & Birks, 2014; Mintzberg, 1994,
1987; Noordegraaf, van der Steen, & van Twist, 2014; Whittington, 1993). There are
many ways for ordering the diﬀerent approaches for doing strategy. Mintzberg (1987)
alone has presented many diﬀerent orderings, varying from 5 to 10, to as much as 32
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diﬀerent perspectives. More importantly, Mintzberg nuances the relevance of any
speciﬁc ordering; what matters is the use of a (or any) variety of perspectives to see
depth and escape the narrow focus of ‘strategy as a plan’ that dominates the ﬁeld
(Mintzberg, 1987).
In this paper we distinguish between ﬁve diﬀerent perspectives on doing strategy that
we have used often in executive education for senior-level policymakers and public
managers. We based the distinction on two diﬀerent bodies of work. First, we used
Mintzberg’s (1994) distinction between ﬁve ‘schools’ for thinking about strategy; strat-
egy as a plan; as a position; as a ploy; as a perspective; as a pattern. Second, to better suit
the context of public policy we adapted these schools along the lines of ﬁve theoretical
perspectives presented by de Caluwé and Vermaak (2003) to order approaches to
change management; they distinguish between change management as a blueprint-
approach, a human relations approach, a power relations approach, a sensemaking
approach, and as an emergence approach. We combined these into ﬁve perspectives to
view strategy that can bring variety in the conversation about strategizing, or in this
case about the design of deliberate policy for complex issues; strategy as rational
planning; strategy as visionary leadership; strategy as a political power game; strategy
as collective sensemaking; strategy as capacity building. We will introduce each perspec-
tive here.
In the remainder of this paper we will toggle between discussing the perspectives as
‘strategy-perspectives’ and ‘design-perspectives’. We introduce each perspective in the
language of strategizing, after which we shift to the language of policy design. So,
instead of a sequential approach where we ﬁrst present all of the perspectives in
‘strategy-language’ and then translating them into design-language, for reasons of
readability and clarity we choose to combine these in the discussion of each perspective.
Moreover, it is important to clarify the choice we made in the distinction between
‘vision’ and ‘strategy’. In the deﬁnition of strategy and design we use in this paper,
setting the goal, the strategic intent, or deﬁning the policy-issue are not part of the
strategy-process or the design-process; strategy is seen here as the process to ﬁnd and
choose solutions for a given issue. This is congruent with most of the strategy literature
(Lusk & Birks, 2014), but there are also conceptualizations that see the deﬁnition of
strategic intent as part of the strategy process. In this paper we refer to vision as setting
the goal and formulating strategic intent, and strategy as developing the path towards
achieving that goal. However, as we will see, in order to design for robustness reﬂection
on the strategic intent itself is also at times part of the strategy-process, and it is done
diﬀerently in each perspective.
The rational-expert perspective
This perspective refers to the literature that sees strategizing as a rational-analytical
process with a focus on systematical planning and implementation. Mintzberg (1987)
refers to this as ‘strategy as plan’, meaning that the course of action is purposely and
consciously thought out in advance; strategic behavior is intended (Bailey & Johnson,
2001; Drucker, 1974; Mintzberg, 1987; Steiner, 1969). The strategy itself is based on the
use of analytical evidence analyses and is supported by speciﬁc strategizing techniques
such as planning (Andrews, 1971; Ansoﬀ, 1965; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). The strategy
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itself is a long-term plan, that is deliberate, carefully articulated, precise and integrated
(Glueck, 1980; Hedley, 1977; Hendry, 2000). The execution of this plan is a matter of
management that carries out the original plan in detail. Strategy formulation and
implementation are separated processes (Jarzabkowski, 2005). In this perspective, a
successful strategy provides a substantiated analysis and a detailed ‘blue-print’ for the
steps that need to be taken in order to tackle the root cause of the problem.
In this perspective, the strategist is an analytical-expert (Miles & Snow, 1978). He is a
‘planner’ who makes decisions based on evidence (Hendry, 2000; Steiner, 1969). He
acknowledges the importance of a well-deﬁned plan and implements it meticulously . In
each step of the process, evidence, data, knowledge, expertise are imperative; these allow
the strategist to determine the best course of action; strategy follows from analysis.
Strategists use analytical tools such as SWOT/PESTEL, stakeholder mapping, value
chain analyses (Christensen, Andrews, Bower, Hamermesh, & Porter, 1982), or the
‘ﬁve forces model’ (Porter, 1979) for strategic analysis.
There are several strong points to the perspective of strategy as a plan. It brings order
to the often-chaotic practices of an organization and its environment. Moreover, a
strategic plan is instructive for the organization and can be used to align the organiza-
tional capacity and instruct others what to do. There are also weaknesses to this
perspective. The crisp analysis of a complex problem requires reduction of the problem
and the context. Moreover, this perspective suggests a clear divide between strategy
formulation and implementation; the analysis is reserved for the ﬁrst phase of the
process; in the implementation phase there is no room for reﬂection on the original
plan. Furthermore, this perspective focuses mainly on elements of the organization and
the environment that can be included in analytical and often quantitative models;
anything that cannot be modelled cannot be part of the strategic process, even though
it may be relevant.
The perspective of strategy as a plan may be problematic for achieving robust-
ness. Robustness is needed when there is deep uncertainty, complexity is intense,
and problems are ‘wicked’. These factors make it diﬃcult to develop a rational
analysis that captures all of the complexity and uncertainty. A rational-planning
approach can only lead to a robust policy design if it is possible to gather suﬃcient
evidence and data to ‘map’ the whole of the problem and to foresee all of the
possible policy-options and outcomes. This is diﬃcult for ‘tamed’ problems in stable
systems, and it is almost impossible for wicked issues, in a highly uncertain and
volatile environment.
The visionary leadership perspective
In the perspective of visionary leadership, the strategy needed to achieve a goal emerges
from the personal ideas of a visionary leader (Ackoﬀ, 1993; Bailey & Johnson, 2001;
Drucker, 1970; Jaques & Clement, 1991; Mintzberg, 1987). Strategy as visionary leader-
ship sees strategy as an almost intuitive; it is as the leader ‘feels it’ should be (Bennis &
Nanus, 1985). Sketchy as this sounds, there are many examples of visionary leaders,
both in the worlds of business and government, who were able to achieve goals that no
analytical process would have ﬁgured possible. Especially in innovative environments,
494 M. VAN DER STEEN AND M. VAN TWIST
where there is much uncertainty and ambiguity, visionary leaders can ‘see pathways’
towards a strategic goal that others cannot imagine or do not dare to suggest.
A visionary strategy provides energy and inspiration to those who work to solve a
policy problem and creates clarity for them about the long-term direction (Kouzes &
Posner, 1995; Nanus, 1992). These are important elements for design processes that
require individuals to cooperate on complex and ambiguous tasks. Visionary leadership
can produce the ‘belief’ to keep agents going, provide a shared framework to make
sense of ambiguity, and allows people to work together on complex tasks. A shared
framework can be extremely helpful to ‘get the design done’, even if it is not necessarily
‘right’.
Seen from this perspective, strategizing involves a leader who proposes an idea or
concept about the path to go, which appeals to the people who have to work with it.
This draws them into a joint process of ‘working out the details’ and work into the same
direction, further down the path presented by the leader. The ‘vision’ at the start of a
strategy-process acts as a guiding framework for action and interpretation, and lays out
the lines for agents to work on further details of the plans (Kouzes & Posner, 1995;
Nanus, 1992).
Visionary leadership does not come from the use of analytical tools, but tools can
help the leader to share the visionary story. They organize retreats, meetings, create
‘visuals’, brands, and hold ‘Ted-talks’ to communicate their beliefs and set out the path
for the others to follow. Consider this example; a permanent-secretary visited elderly
care homes to see the ‘problem’ of the sector ﬁrst-hand; during one of the visits he was
really touched by an elderly man who tells them he has worked in a factory all his life,
only to ﬁnd himself spending the last years of his life in a ‘care-factory’. This then
became the basis for a program to radically reform elderly care, called ‘Dignity and
Pride’. The story of the old man in the factory became the tool to communicate the
vision and to lay-out the problem and the direction in which to go and look for a
solution. This energized policy-makers in the organization with a new narrative to
guide their design of policy for elderly care. Whenever new unexpected challenges
emerged ‘Dignity and Pride’ provided them with a guiding framework to interpret the
new dynamics.
Strong points in this perspective are the attention for the personal side of strategy;
the visionary leader provides a face to the strategy. Moreover, strategy is not an abstract
product, but something to believe in and ‘go for’; it generates energy and passion. The
weaknesses of this perspective are related to the personal heroism it holds; it can even
invoke a ‘personal cult’, invoke groupthink, and there is an obvious risk that the leader
is wrong.
The perspective of strategy as visionary leadership suits the notion of robustness quite
well, in the sense that the visionary story provides direction to the design eﬀorts.
Moreover, given that the visionary image is unspeciﬁed, there is much room for
maneuvering along the way; the path remains open for interpretation as long as it
does not challenge the core assumptions. The latter may be problematic for robustness;
perhaps ‘Dignity and Pride’ is not such a productive principle for the health care sector
after all. Who then is able to critically reﬂect on it? The most important weakness is the
dominant position of the leader; there are many cases of group-think and strategy lock-
in, where the visionary path blocks the ability to see what is emerging and react to it.
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The sensemaking perspective
The sensemaking perspective sees strategizing primarily as a process to create shared
meaning in an organization (Bailey & Johnson, 2001; Chia, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 2005;
Mintzberg, 1987; Pye, 1995). Like in visionary leadership, shared meaning provides a
basis for joint action. However, unlike visionary leadership, shared meaning here is
produced in interaction between agents, in joint processes of sensemaking (March &
Olsen, 1989; Weick, 2001); sharing stories, models, ‘maps’, pictures, and symbols helps
to create a shared meaning between diﬀerent actors in the organization, so that they can
work eﬃciently and eﬀectively on the complex task of ﬁnding a path towards a solution
for a policy problem (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Weick, 2001).
‘Strategic stories’ help policymakers engaged in policy design to make sense of the
complexities in the environment and provides them with a guide for action (Weick,
2001). Strategizing helps the organization and its members to make sense of the
complexity and ambiguity they encounter. A sensemaking perspective to strategizing
draws attention to the importance of developing a joint causal story that helps to deal
with complexity.
To develop this capacity, a strategic process needs to support interaction and
learning (de Caluwé & Vermaak, 2003). The process empowers individual actors to
come up with ideas, even if their formal status in the organization would suggest
otherwise. The process of dialogue is more important than any speciﬁc document
that comes out of that process. The document is only important as a symbol that
invokes shared sense that was made in the process. The real product is the shared
meaning participators hold, which they ‘enact’ (Weick, 2001) when they work on the
policy issue.
Tools are used to facilitate interaction and the learning process. Seen from this
perspective, a SWOT-analysis is not an analytical tool, but rather a platform to engage
in a conversation. While agents formulate ideas about strengths and weaknesses, they
are ﬁnding shared meaning. From this perspective, that is the real outcome. Therefore,
a design-process is to be designed as an interaction-process, in which agents can
together ‘ﬁnd’ and ‘co-create’ the strategy they are looking for.
A strong point of the sensemaking perspective is the attention for underlying
values in the organization. It helps to understand the social fabric of the groups that
are doing the design. Moreover, shared meaning can enhance the organizations’
ability to deal with unexpected events and be adaptive in the face of uncertainty
(Välikangas, 2010).
A risk of this approach is that collective sensemaking is reliant on the participants
and their group-dynamics. Dominant group members can block the dialogue in the
group, and the lack of outsiders in the group can create a tunnel-vision. Mundane
problems also play a role; groups can be tired, grow weary, or become dominated by
loud voices. Some also argue that this process is ‘slow’; ﬁnding common ground can be
a cumbersome and lengthy process; it may take many meetings to develop a joint
understanding of the problem.
The approach of strategy as collective sensemaking could suit the concept of robust-
ness well. As long as the sensemaking process remains open and outward looking it can
be a powerful basis for continuous adaptation and redesign of policy, along with
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emerging developments and new insights. Sensemaking also suits the conditions for
robust policy design well; deep uncertainty and unknown dynamics are ambiguous and
require active sensemaking by agents. Agents will be likely to carry that mindset on into
the further process. Moreover, a sensemaking process also familiarizes agents with the
‘normalcy’ of uncertainty; the process nurtures the idea that conditions are ambiguous,
unpredictable, complex, and that agents should continuously reﬂect on what is happen-
ing around them.
The political power game perspective
The political nature of organizations is the focal assumption in the power game
perspective to strategizing (Allison, 1971; Bailey & Johnson, 2001; Pettigrew, 1973).
Here, politics is not ‘party politics’ but organization politics; the inevitable ‘political
ﬁght’ of members of the organization over scarce resources, dominance, and inﬂuence
in the organization that is designing policy. Every policy design has consequences for
the distribution of power and resources; this perspective puts this political struggle at
the forefront of the analysis and practice of ‘doing’ strategy, and of doing policy design
(Lusk & Birks, 2014; Mintzberg, 1994).
A design distributes scarce resources; actors recognize their interests in the distribu-
tion and mobilize the leverage they have to inﬂuence the outcomes of the process.
External stakeholders attempt to bend the design to their favor and start lobbying
(Bolman & Deal, 1997; Pettigrew, 1973). Seen from this perspective, drawing up a
strategy is a set of power games, in which actors attempt to forge a strong enough
coalition of support (Narayanan & Fahey, 1982; Schwenck, 1989). Strategic decisions
become possible when a temporary coalition of key players is able to translate its shared
interests into a strategic ‘object’; e.g. a decision, action-plan, or policy proposal.
Strategizing takes place in activities such as negotiation, bargaining and coalition
formation; these are not alien to strategy, and are not ‘foul play’, but are a normal
part of any strategy-process (Mintzberg, 1994).
An important strength of this perspective is that it pays attention to the often-
concealed dimension of organizational politics. Looking at coalitions, power games, and
vested interests help to understand obstruction and resistance in organizations.
Moreover, it also explains why some strategies ‘work’; ideas make it into a design not
because the concept is analytically ﬂawless, but because it mobilizes enough support to
reach a temporary agreement over what to do. From this perspective, that is not a sub-
optimal outcome, but a success; strategy-formulation always requires compromise,
political pragmatism is a normal part of any design process.
The weakness of this perspective is that it can easily turn into a cynical approach; it
reduces a design process to getting enough stakeholders on board, no matter what the
content is they agree upon. Moreover, ‘politicizing’ a strategy process can also block
creative processes that were also taking place. It can easily escalate into a political battle-
ground, as others develop counter-strategies, by coalitions of other interest groups that
seek to promote a design that is favorable to them.
The perspective of strategy as political coalition building is somewhat problematic in
relation to robustness. This perspective focuses on balancing diﬀerent stakes in the
organization. It will be diﬃcult to translate rapidly changing external conditions into
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new power coalitions. Coalitions will be likely to conﬁrm the status quo. Moreover,
political consensus takes a signiﬁcant amount of time and commitment from stake-
holders to create; that is why stakeholders will want to hold on to it for a longer time.
This will make it harder to change the design along the way. Designs are ‘easy to
change’ of there are obvious gains for powerful dominant agents in the coalition, but
otherwise it is almost impossible to change a design along the way.
The capacity-building perspective
A ﬁfth perspective sees strategy is deliberately emergent; a deliberate eﬀort to adapt in a
yet unknown manner to unknown changes when they emerge. Already in his early
work Mintzberg (1987) coined the distinction between intended and emergent strategy.
It is often understood as a diﬀerence between strategy as intended beforehand and how
strategy plays out in practice. The perspective of strategy as capacity building sees
emergence as an inevitable and therefore inherent element of any strategy, or design.
From the perspective of capacity-building emergence is the starting-point for strategiz-
ing; a strategy positions the organization or the system to maximize its beneﬁt from
inevitable emergence (Sutcliﬀe & Vogus, 2003; Teisman et al., 2009).
The perspective of capacity building sets aside the notion of design as ‘setting out a
path’, but sees it as a deliberate positioning for ﬁnding the path along the way; a
designated capacity to help the organization deal with emergent development and
respond eﬀectively to how complexity unfolds in real time; a structural capacity to
deal with the unexpected. This approach seeks to maximize the responsiveness to
emerging developments; not as a means of improvisation because of surprise, but
intended, deliberately planned and organized for; the organization is designed to
manage the unexpected (Weick & Sutcliﬀe, 2001; Weick, Sutcliﬀe, & Obstfeldt, 2002).
From this perspective strategy is intended to improve the capacity of the orga-
nization to respond to what happens in real time, not to plan ahead (Aldrich, 1979;
Bailey & Johnson, 2001). Changes in the environment push the organization to turn
real time developments into opportunities (Swanson & Bhadwal, 2009; Välikangas,
2010; Walker et al., 2010). The key capacity of a design is it’s the responsiveness to
deal with a dynamic environment (Boin & van Eeten, 2013; Hamel & Välikangas,
2003). This implies that strategy is not a project but rather an ongoing process
(Välikangas, 2010); a continuous process of adapting, learning, growing, and trans-
forming in response to real time developments in and around the organization
(Weick, 2001).
The attention paid to emergence and ‘surprise’, as well as to concepts of redundancy
and experimentation, are strong points of this perspective. It warns against too much
planned strategy that pretends the world to be known and blinds agents to see divergent
emerging developments as they happen. However, this perspective does not take into
full account the virtues of anticipation and emphasizes the environment as the critical
factor for success; an often-heard critique is that if strategy is merely responsive the
policy may be going anywhere the environment takes it. Moreover, adaptivity also bares
costs; an adaptive system cannot easily develop economies of scale, nor reap the beneﬁts
of routines and repeated practices.
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The perspective of strategy as capacity building seems well suited for robustness; the core
of this perspective is that the environment is uncertain and volatile and that design involves
a continuous reﬂection on what is happening outside. Instead of ‘planning ahead’, policy is
systematically positioned to deliberately change along the way. This is still ‘robust’ in the
sense that the original goal is not put into question; there is still strategic intend, but it is
achieved by steps that are formulated along the way. The policy-goal remains the focal point
and is used as a compass for decisions and adaptations along the way.
Five perspectives for ‘doing design’
The diﬀerent perspectives focus on diﬀerent aspects of strategy or design; the perspec-
tives can be used as lenses to observe a strategy practice or a policy design process. Each
perspective opens up a range of choices for policymakers who are ‘doing’ policy design;
instead of the frame of design as ‘rational planning’ there are ﬁve possible routes to
arrive at a robust policy design. This answers the ﬁrst part of our research question; we
distinguish between ﬁve diﬀerent theoretical approaches for doing policy design; even
though we concede, along with Mintzberg (1987), that other distinctions are possible as
well; the point is that there is a variety of theoretical perspectives, much broader than
the singular perspective of design as a rational-analytical ‘strategic planning’ approach.
Each perspective holds merit and has its own norms for good or bad quality design.
This broadens the notion of doing policy design and opens up more ways for the design
of robust policy. The question how to arrive at a robust policy design can be answered
along the lines of ﬁve diﬀerent perspectives. Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics
of each approach.
Table 1.: Key characteristics of the diﬀerent strategy perspectives.
Strategy is. . .
Success is assessed
by. . .
A good strategist
is. . .
Strategy tools are
used as. . .
Rational-
Expert
A deliberate, precise and
integrated long-term plan or
roadmap
The contribution to the
achievement of key
performance
indicators
A planner with
analytical skills
and expertise
Analyses that
identify the
best steps to
take
Leadership An inspiring vision that is
propagated by leaders
The drive and passion
the strategy
generates with
people
A visionary leader
with the ability to
convey ideas
Means to
communicate
the vision, and
to deliver
evidence for it
Sensemaking A process of collective
sensemaking by actors that
gives them a shared meaning
of what the organization
The ability of a strategy
to create shared
meaning
A facilitator and
connector with
communicative
skills
Enablers to
engage in a
conversation
Political
Power
game
Bargaining with stakeholders (in
or outside the organization)
to forge the winning
coalition necessary to
achieve a goal
The ability of the
strategy to generate
a majority, and/or
pacify the opposition
to it
A negotiator with a
feeling for politics
and interests
Tools or
‘weapons’ to
inﬂuence
stakeholders
Capacity-
building
Building the capacity to
respond to yet unknown
emerging changes
The ability to notice,
assess, and appraise
developments early
and respond to them
A scout who nurtures
and stimulates the
open mindset of
the organization
Means to remain
alert and
reﬂective
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Research design and methods
In order to answer the second part of our research question, ‘how do the various theoretical
approaches relate to the work practice of policy designers’, we were interested in knowing
more about how policymakers think about the diﬀerent routes tomake robust policy. More
speciﬁcally, we were interested in two things; how they were at that time doing this in their
own work-practice; and how they think it should be done.
Knowing the diﬀerence between how it is (Ist) and how they think it should be (Soll)
is interesting for two reasons. First, we want to see if there is a gap between ‘ist’ and
‘soll’; and if so, what the most important diﬀerences are. Second, we wanted to see
which of the approaches policymakers perceive to suit their practice best. This is not to
say we can actually see what they ‘really’ do in practice; we are limited to their
perceptions of practice, and to what they say they prefer; we see their stated preferences,
not the preferred behavior of the participants in our study. That is why we call it a
normative preference; we see what practitioners say is important to them.
In order to ‘catch’ the perspectives and perceptions in the mind of policymakers we
used a survey-feedback method. Survey-feedback is a qualitative research method that
originates from the ﬁeld of organizational development (Bennebroek Gravenhorst,
2007; Björklund, Grahn, Jensen, & Bergström, 2007; French & Bell, 1999). The method
is a combination of a survey and a qualitative discussion among respondents of the
survey, who can then reﬂect on the results of the survey. The method resembles the
more traditional Delphi method, but with a much smaller sample size, and with a
diﬀerent balance between the survey and the discussion; the survey sets participants up
for a discussion, which is the most important element of the method. The survey
produces a basis for discussion that focuses the discussion among the respondents.
The starting point of survey feedback is a survey of which the (quantitative) data are
used in a feedback session to generate the qualitative data; the survey-data is not meant
to produce a complete picture of the perceptions of respondents, but functions as the
context for respondents to engage in a conversation (Björklund et al., 2007).
Respondents of the survey are asked to discuss and interpret the outcomes of the
survey in group-settings, which provides added insight (Boonstra, 2004; Kuhnert,
1993). Table 2 lists the most important diﬀerences between a traditional survey and
the survey feedback method.
In our survey feedback study, we took four steps. Firstly, we designed a survey based
on the conceptual framework of the ﬁve perspectives for the design of robust policy that
we took from the literature on strategy and strategizing.
Table 2. Diﬀerences between classical survey research and survey feedback method.
Survey method Survey feedback method
● Emphasis on knowledge by measuring
● Results conceived as representation of reality
● Results interpret by researcher
● Reporting of results seen as ﬁnal outcome
● Field perceives ﬁndings and conclusions as
information
● Researcher focuses on careful execution of
research
● Emphasis on learning from outcomes
● Results conceived as starting point for conversation and
discussion
● Results interpret jointly by researcher and respondents
● Reporting of results seen as intermediate outcome
● Field coproduces ﬁndings and conclusions
● Researcher as facilitator of the process of sensemaking
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Secondly, we operationalized the four dimensions into survey items. First, we
developed ﬁve items for each dimension. We tested these in a pilot-survey with a
small group of policymakers. They completed the survey and we discussed the
personal proﬁles from the survey with them individually. We used their feedback
for ﬁnalizing the survey items, which resulted in the deﬁnitive survey list (see
Appendix 1).
Thirdly, we asked the respondents of the study to complete the survey online.
Respondents were all senior level policy-makers assigned to design a policy for a
complex policy issue; they keep that task in mind when completing the survey and
in the discussion in the feedback session. One part of the respondents were inter-
national groups of participants of an executive course that the researchers taught at
a recognized executive education institute in Germany; another part of the respon-
dents were participants to an executive course taught in a prominent executive
education institute in The Netherlands. All respondents followed a course on
‘strategic policy and governance’ and came to the course with the question how to
more ‘strategically’ design policies to deliver results under complex conditions, in a
volatile environment; participants were asked to complete the survey with that
policy issue and task (deliver results under complex conditions and a volatile
environment) in mind. For example, one of the participants was responsible for
designing policy for the ‘integration’ of immigrants during the refuge-crisis in 2016.
For the respondents it came naturally that they were not designing a quick ﬁx, but
were looking for a long-term solution for a highly uncertain and volatile issue; in
that sense, each participant completed the survey with a process of robust policy-
design in mind.
In the survey respondents rank individual statements from most agree to most
disagree. They are asked to rank statements ﬁrst on how they think strategy currently
is (the ‘Ist’ situation) and then how strategy should be (the ‘Soll’ situation). For both the
ist-situation and the soll-situation respondents rank items on a scale from 1 to 5, and
each value can be given only once. Our sample consisted of 99 participants.1 All
respondents were senior level policymakers in the public sector. Seventy-nine of them
were from the Netherlands, 20 were from other countries, such as Germany, France,
Belgium, Italy, Austria, Romania and Switzerland.
Fourthly, we organized feedback sessions in which respondents could discuss
their data. The session allowed respondents to reﬂect on their choices and elabo-
rate on the arguments they had for their choices. Respondents from the
Netherlands had sessions in The Hague, international respondents discussed the
survey in Berlin. In these sessions outcomes of the survey were used to start a
discussion; each respondent was ﬁrst presented with a personal ‘Ist’ and ‘Soll’
proﬁle on a paper-sheet, and discussed that with one other respondent. After that
the discussion was opened-up to a plenary discussion that focused on a reﬂection
on the scores and the apparent preferences and perceptions about strategic policy
design in the group.
1Total response was 104 with 5 invalid entries (48%) and non-response was 112 (52%, mainly due to complaints about
the length of the survey). Respondents were participants in executive education programs of the Netherlands School
of Public Administration (NSOB, The Hague) and the Hertie School of Governance (Berlin).
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Empirical ﬁndings
Findings of the survey
We will discuss the ﬁndings from the survey here; Appendix 3 presents the full scores of
the survey. For the ‘ist-situation’ we found that most respondents see the current
practice as coalition building (P4) and as capacity building (P5). However, respondents
note that the practice should be more about collective sensemaking (P3) and visionary
leadership (P2).
The second dimension asks what a successful practice currently is and what it should
be. Many respondents say that a successful process currently (ist) is measured by its
success in playing the power game (P4) and the direct contribution to Key Performance
Indicators (KPI’s) in the organization (P1). However, respondents think that success of
a process should (soll) be measured by the passion it generates among everybody
working on the issue (P2), and the ability to create shared meaning among them (P3).
The third dimension looks at the ‘strategist’, or ‘designers’ themselves: what type of
practitioners are required for doing this type of work? Strategists are currently (ist) seen
mostly as power brokers (perspective 4), and as planners and experts (P1). However,
respondents want (soll) strategists to be more facilitators (P3) and visionary lea-
ders (P2).
The fourth dimension, the use of tools for strategic design, shows that respondents
think that tools are mostly used for rational analysis (P1). However, they think that
tools should be used more to get the conversation going (P3) and to articulate inspiring
visions (P2). Tools should be used less as instrumental and analytical tools, and more as
‘vehicles’ for developing shared meaning (P3) and a joint vision for the organiza-
tion (P2).
In general, the survey shows that for the ist-situation there is much attention for the
powergame perspective (P4) and the perspective of rational-planning (P1). Strategy is
considered a highly politicized process; build around functional or symbolic rational
analysis and planning. For the soll-situation respondents have a strong preference for to
the leadership perspective (P2) and for the sensemaking perspectives (P3). According to
the respondents, strategy should be more about collective sensemaking and visionary
leadership, and less of a powergame or analytical exercise. The perspective of deliberate
emergency (P5) does not score very high for both ist and soll; respondents do not
recognize it as a valuable perspective for ﬁnding robust policy solutions for complex
policy issues, and do not see it being done in their own practice.
Findings from the feedback sessions
The results of the survey were used for discussions with the respondents. Each respon-
dent received both their individual scores of the survey and the average scores of the
whole sample as input for the feedback sessions. Figure 1 presents an example of an
individual score, and see Appendix 2 for a ﬁgure of the average group score.
In the ﬁrst part of the discussion respondents reﬂected directly on the survey data.
Here again, the ist situation was described by most participants as a powergame, with
the process mostly designed to get key players on board, or neutralize their resistance to
a plan. Additionally, the expert perspective was recognized as very dominant in the
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everyday strategic practice. The respondents made it clear they would prefer to see
more of the leadership and sensemaking perspective, because this would help to get
more people involved in the process. The soll situation should in the eyes of partici-
pants be characterized more by visionary leadership and by more interaction facilitated
by them as policy designers.
However, during the discussion respondents started to reconsider their initial views.
They still saw the reality of strategy to be mostly about the power game, but began to
nuance the gap between the ist and the soll of strategy. The discussion especially
focused on what it meant that respondents apparently desire a diﬀerent perspective
than the ones they use in their practice. The power game perspective was seen as
‘wrong’, at least in the results of the survey. However, in the discussion during the
feedback sessions the question was raised whether it is really wrong to aim for a strategy
that organizes a dominant power-coalition that actually enables action? Respondents
noted that the context in which they work demands consensus building and requires
them to be pragmatic; therefore, also sensitive to organizational politics, bargaining,
and political feasibility of proposals. Moreover, in the discussion they were less positive
about the leadership-perspective. Respondents argued that their positive attention for
this perspective in the survey was mostly a complaint about a lack of guidance and
involvement of senior leadership in policy design processes in their practice; they were
not pleading for a ‘visionary leader’ to take them by the hand, but wanted to see more
involvement and also a sense of purpose from the senior leadership; not just technical
management, but also more reference to the greater public cause by leaders in the
organization.
Figure 1. Example of an individual score sheet.
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The same goes for the call for more sensemaking-eﬀorts; respondents valued the idea
that ﬁnding solutions for complex policy issues is very much a collaborative process, in
which a wide range of voices should participate. Respondents felt that a good process
requires everyone to be able to bring his or her ideas and expertise to the table;
according to the respondents, designing a solution for a complex policy issue requires
less of a drawing board and more of an open space for discussion.
Moreover, during the feedback sessions it became apparent that respondents distin-
guished between two ‘stages’ of their design processes; a front-stage and a back-stage.
At the front-stage, respondents reported that they would ‘perform’ rationality, leader-
ship, data-analysis, and use tools for strategic planning. They would present their work
and their process in the language and outputs that suit the perspective of rational
planning; a rational analysis to enable a process of structured and objective decision
about a policy or strategy.
Back-stage they would do things diﬀerently. Participants argued that in the back-
stage processes they would have a lot of attention for collective sensemaking (P3), for
the political power game (P4), and also attempt to build-in elements of capacity for
emerging issues and emerging insights (P5) into their design; even though that per-
spective (P5) scored low in the survey. Respondents were aware that they although they
were presenting conﬁdently their front-stage plans, they knew that their assumptions
were often wrong or had a short expiry date. However, for them this did not matter all
that much; simultaneously with their conﬁdent front-stage plans, they organized a
parallel back-stage process that took uncertainty much more into account.
Respondents argued that the reason to do this back-stage is that they do not think it
will hold in the dynamics of the front-stage; when asked what is the most important
‘stage’ was for them they unequivocally answered that the back stage is where it really
happens; however, they also were quite sure that what they did backstage was probably
not accepted as a front-stage strategy. Even though they all build in elements of capacity
building in their designs, they did not think that would be accepted as a ‘formal
strategy’ for dealing with uncertainty. Interestingly, they were not all that negative
about this practical combination of realities. The front-stage served a purpose, they
argued; a good front-stage performance allows participants to do back-stage what they
think is really important. Without a good front-stage ‘rational-planning’-performance
all of the other valuable elements could not be performed back-stage.
Table 3 summarizes how the respondents think about the processes front-stage and
back-stage.
Conclusion
In this paper we have used the strategy-literature to distinguish ﬁve diﬀerent perspec-
tives for how to arrive at a robust policy design; or as we have phrased it here, to ‘do’
robust policy design. Instead of the often-used perspective of design as a rational-
analytical planning-process, there is a wide variety of coherent approaches to produce
robust policy design; or to do strategizing, as the literature on strategy refers to it. Each
of them involves deliberate and conscious design of policy options, but with diﬀerent
rationales, a diﬀerent focus, and diﬀerent notions of how a good strategy or design is
made. The literature-study makes clear that each theoretical perspective can produce a
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robust design; the perspectives represent distinctly diﬀerent routes that practitioners
can take to arrive at the same ‘strategic’ destination.
However, the survey-feedback study shows that policymakers hold interesting
views on the practical merit of each perspective. When asked to score the perspec-
tives on normative preference and empirical reality, the powergame perspective (P4)
and the rational-planning perspective (P1) stand out as the empirical reality. Policy
making is considered politicized, a battleground for turf wars. That political process
is covered in the language and instruments of rational analysis and planning.
Moreover, in the survey respondents argue that strategy should be diﬀerent (soll);
they have a strong preference for to the leadership perspective P2 and the sensemak-
ing perspectives (P 3). The perspective of capacity building (P5) is not valued
positively for both the ist and the soll situation; respondents do not see it happen
in practice and do not think it should.
The discussions in the feedback sessions nuanced this initial image from the survey.
During the discussions respondents were less outspoken about the political dimension of
strategy. They recognized it in practice, but were far less negative about it; they considered it
an inherent element of the public sector. They took it deliberately into account; as a
legitimate route to arrive at a supported design. In fact, most respondents considered
themselves quite good at this political power game and acknowledged that their ability to
create coalitions was an important reason for them to get their job; and hold it. Moreover,
they nuanced the need for ‘leadership’; they claimed that this normative call for ‘vision’
should be interpreted as a sign of the current missing of inspiring leadership in their
organizations. They wanted a bit more of that, but do not see pure visionary leadership as a
good route for arriving at a robust policy design for a complex issue.
What became clear in the feedback sessions was that participants see two ‘stages’ for
doing strategy; a front stage and a back stage. On the front stage they pretend strategy
to be objective, planned, controlled, and phased. But the real strategizing happens back-
stage, where it is a process of small steps, in an incremental process, while keeping a
good eye on participation and a broad ownership in the organization. The reasons for
Table 3. The front-stage and back-stage of strategy.
Back stage: what solving a complex policy problem ‘really
is’
Front stage: what they ‘pretend solving a policy problem
to be’
Incremental, creative, improvising Rational, analytical, comprehensive
The essence of a robust design is the capacity to stay
alert, to expecting the unexpected, and to respond
quickly to emergent changes.
The essence of a robust design is to clarify strategic
goals, model the environment, and design a plan to
systematically work towards the goals.
Formulation and execution are intertwined and
interdependent ‘phases’ of a policy; a robust design
requires the possibility of continuous re-design.
There is clear distinction between formulation and
implementation of policy; changes can be made, but
only at designated times and in case of serious ﬂaws in
the original design.
A good strategy is adaptive: it holds the capability to
notice emerging trends early and formulate a strategic
response to it.
A good strategy is grounded in consensus on mission,
values, and vision, and supported by rigorous, ongoing
analysis
Measurement helps to see if the strategy works, but
predetermined milestones can draw attention to the
wrong issues.
What is measured gets done. Milestones are used to
check if the strategy is working and should be
adapted.
Politics is part of that process; it is a core-function of
strategy to build a base of support, and deal with the
‘losers’ of the strategy process.
Politics is not part of the strategy-process; rational
arguments dominate, decisions are made on the basis
of information, politics should be organized ‘out’ of
the process.
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the separation in two stages is, according to participants, the fact that their environment
would otherwise not accept the outcomes of a design process; people want strategy to
be planned, objective and controlled, even though they probably know it looks more
improvised in reality. At least, that is what they think; we did not check with their
management or with politicians.
Discussion
When we go back to our research question, we can draw several conclusions. We asked
ourselves how robust policy design is done. We found that what policy design is and
how it should be done depends on the perspective one picks, or the combination
between perspectives for that matter. Each perspective highlights diﬀerent elements in
what is important in design processes and what drivers for a successful design process
are; this can be helpful for policymakers who want to design policy, but also for scholars
who study current design practices or look at cases of successful or failed policy designs.
It is interesting to reﬂect on the diﬀerent perspectives in the strategy-literature. There are
many diﬀerent approaches to doing strategy and these are all well-described in the
literature. However, the underlying message of prominent strategy-scholars such as
Mintzberg (1994), Whittington (1996), and Jarzabkowksi (2005) is that for all the con-
ceptual variety the strategy ﬁeld remains dominated by a ‘strategy-as-planning’ perspective
of strategy. All of the other perspectives serve mostly as ‘counter-weights’ against the
dominant normative perspective of strategy as a rational-analytical process; that is some-
thing strategy scholars worry about and it is important for the design-practice as well;
practitioners and researchers should be able to diﬀer between perspectives.
The emerging ﬁeld of policy design may take warning from this observation from the
strategy literature; the language of policy design is inherently rationalistic; a design is a
deliberate and conscious eﬀort to relate means to strategic goals, and that seems to lead
naturally to a rational-analytical model for ‘doing’ it. But, as we have seen in the
literature and in the empirical study there is a variety of ‘rationales’ for doing strategy;
deliberate design can be done ‘rationally’ in distinctly diﬀerent ways (Mintzberg, 1994).
This observation is all the more important because we have seen that the rational-
analytical model is not very well suited for the conditions that require robustness; uncertainty,
complexity, and volatility complicate attempts to model the environment and ‘calculate’ a
robust solution for a problem. The rational-planning perspective is well-suited for tamed
problems in a stable environment, but becomes much harder to work from when conditions
are uncertain and volatile. Not only are other approaches available, they are much needed to
develop real robust designs for complex problems in an uncertain and volatile context.
These observations and lessons from the strategy-literature are in line with the lessons
from the empirical study we conducted. When we asked practitioners how they ‘do’ design
and how they think it should be done, it was interesting to see how they made a clear
distinction between a rational-analytical front-stage, and an entirely diﬀerent back-stage. The
practitioners claimed that ‘back-stage’ was where the ‘real strategizing’ took place. In fact,
what the practitioners claimed they did in practice was very much a process of small steps
towards a predetermined goal, of making sense of developments along the way, ﬁnding
common ground with others in the organization, and building capacity to deal with unex-
pected developments. All this suggests that there is already a large body of practical
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experience with diﬀerent rationales in policy design, where robustness is achieved in practices
that deviate from the traditional frame of the rational-analytical perspective. For the practi-
tioners in our survey-feedback working on the two separate stages was not really a problem;
they were used to it and made the most of it. They argued that they were able to manage the
two diﬀerent stages in their work; a front-stage where there is rational-analysis and a back-
stage where they work from other rationales to really design policy. It will be interesting to
study this more deeply, in order to developmore speciﬁc theoretical models for designing for
robustness.
Future research could look into the eﬀectiveness of various perspectives, and also the
eﬀectiveness of particular combinations of perspectives. Most practitioners say that they
vary between perspectives, for instance in diﬀerent phases of the project, or for diﬀerent
types of tasks in a design process. It is interesting to see if certain combinations go together
well and produce more robust designs. Moreover, it is interesting to conduct more direct
observations of design processes as they take place, for instance by means of systematic
observation studies, such as conducted by Rhodes, ‘T Hart, and Noordegraaf (2007) who
observed the daily practice of government elites; or by speciﬁc ‘practice-research’, such as
done in the ‘strategy as practice’-research (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007;
Whittington, 1996); research into ‘policy design as practice’ could help researchers to
develop more insight in how design is done, and help practitioners to ‘do it’. In the
executive programs that we used as platform for our empirical study we experienced the
practical need for more practical models for ‘doing design’.
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Appendix 1. Survey list
1.In practice, strategy is about . . .
2.In my opinion, good strategy should be about . . .
a. having a deliberate, carefully articulated, precise and integrated long-term plan
b. leader(s) articulating an inspiring vision to be disseminated internally and externally
c. collective sense making and developing a shared meaning by all relevant stakeholders
d. inﬂuencing others towards agreement about organizational goals and priorities
e. developing immediate responses to emerging changes in our environment
7.In practice, the success or failure of our strategy is assessed in terms of . . .
8.In my opinion, good strategy should be judged on . . .
a. its contribution to our ability to consistently achieve our key performance indicators
b. the drive and passion it generates in people in knowing where we are going
c. its ability to create shared meaning within the organization
d. its fungibility in the power game within and around the organization
e. the resilience it brings to the organization
9.In practice, strategists are primarily . . .
10. In my opinion, good strategists should be . . .
a. planners & experts with analytical skills and expert knowledge
b. visionary leader(s) with imaginative skills and strong intuitions
c. facilitators & connectors, with communication skills and connective capacity
d. power brokers & negotiators, with bargaining skills and good political instincts
e. explorers & boundary workers with a penchant for increasing our agility and ﬂexibility
11.In practice, strategy tools are used to . . .
12.In my opinion, strategy tools should be used to/as . . .
a. get a well substantiated analysis to establish the right courses of action
b. articulate and communicate the visions that will inspire members of the organization
c. get the conversation going about external and internal conditions, aspirations and actions
d. inﬂuence key players towards agreement about goals and allocation of means and gains
e. levers to help us stay alert and agile
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Appendix 2. Sheet with overall average score of respondents.
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